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In its opening brief, the State promotes a form over substance and procedure over 
justice approach to this case. Rather than focus on the issue of whether Angela 
Rasmussen ("Appellant") should be punished because she stole a dress, the State seeks to 
punish her because of alleged mistakes made by both her trial and appellate counsel. 
Appellant admits that her trial counsel did indeed err in several, critical respects and that 
those errors prejudiced her greatly. Indeed, perhaps Appellant's pro bono appellate 
counsel with no criminal experience has erred as well. Appellant, however, should not be 
punished because of the alleged errors of her trial or appellate counsel. 
The relevant inquiries in this case are and should be: (1) whether the prosecution 
admitted sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, (2) whether the trial court abused 
its discretion by excluding evidence relevant to explain Angela's actions in the Deseret 
Industries ("D.I.") parking lot, and (3) whether Angela's trial counsel was so inadequate 
and ineffective that Angela's constitutional right to counsel was violated. 
The State seeks to side-step the relevant inquiries. First, in the face of sufficiently 
marshaled evidence, the State claims that this Court does not have enough evidence in 
front of it to deliberate and form an opinion. Therefore, the State asks the Court to 
disregard the insufficiency claim altogether. Second, the State asks the Court to disregard 
the exclusion of evidence claim by emphasizing trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing 
to proffer the evidence. Finally, the State requests that the Court ignore the ineffective 
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assistance of counsel claim because of appellate counsel's alleged deficiencies in creating 
an adequate record for appeal. 
As mentioned, the State's arguments promote form over substance and largely 
ignore the merits of this case. Appellant has adequately marshaled the evidence to allow 
the Court to make a ruling on the insufficiency claim. Also, failure to proffer the 
excluded evidence at trial simply emphasizes trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Finally, an 
ample record exists for the Court to consider and rule on the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. And even if the Court determines that the record is incomplete, the 
remedy is not to punish Angela but rather to remand the case for findings sufficient to 
complete the record. 
II. BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED ALL THE EVIDENCE 
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT THE COURT SHOULD 
CONSIDER THAT EVIDENCE AND HOLD THAT IT WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A GUILTY VERDICT IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant agrees with this Court's statements that in order to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the appellant "must first marshal all the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the 
most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 
819 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Appellant also agrees that "[fjailure to marshal the evidence 
waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency considered on appeal." 
State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The Appellant disagrees 
with the State, however, in the proposition that the evidence has not been marshaled here. 
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Before addressing the list of evidence the State alleges that appellant failed to 
marshal, it is important to note that the evidence the Appellant did marshal on page 13 of 
her brief mirrors the evidence that the prosecution itself identified as supporting the 
verdict in its Objection to the Motion for Arrest of Judgment below. R: 113-114. It is 
absolutely disingenuous for the State to now aver that the Appellant must marshal more 
evidence than the prosecution itself identified. 
This simply is not a case where the Appellant "made no attempt to marshal the 
evidence in support of the jury finding." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 
800 (Utah 1991). Nor is it a case where the Appellant "wholly fail[ed] to marshal the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict." State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 608 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). Rather, Appellant has complied with this Court's mandate in West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) that the challenger present 
"every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists." Id. at 1315 (emphasis added). While the State has provided a 
laundry list of evidence it claims was not properly marshaled, the listed evidence either 
was marshaled, is not competent, or is does not support the jury's finding of the key 
issue-whether a theft occurred. 
A. Appellant Was Not Required to Marshal the Evidence Provided in the 
State's List Because the Evidence Was Either Marshaled, Incompetent or Did 
Not Support the Jury's Finding of "Theft." 
Each item in the State's list will be dealt with in turn. 
3 
1) Familiarity with the bid section of the store and bidding procedure. 
This piece of evidence is not supportive of the jury's verdict that Angela 
committed a theft. Ms. Rasmussen did admit that she was familiar with the bid area but 
the testimony of Lindsay Waldron, a witness for the State, indicates that Angela did not 
secretively remove the dress from the bid area but rather approached the sales counter 
with it and stood in line there. R. 130: 99. That one frequents and is familiar with a 
Deseret Industries hardly proves that one is guilty. 
2) Defendant did not deny that she removed the wedding dress from the 
bid area. 
This evidence does not support the jury's finding of a theft. For the same reasons 
mentioned above, appellant was not required to marshal this evidence. Moreover, 
counsel in fact told the Court that Appellant did not deny that she had the dress in her 
possession. 
3) Defendant overheard Ms. Waldron express her surprise about 
defendant's inappropriate possession of the dress, she abandoned her 
place in line and her alleged inquiry about the bid status of the dress, and 
then walked toward the rear of the store. 
Again, this evidence does not support the jury's finding of theft. Ms. Waldron 
testified that Angela did not take "evasive action" upon leaving the line. R. 130: 99. 
Also, no evidence was produced that Angela heard Ms. Waldron. Indeed, the fact that 
Angela was standing in the cashier's line at all lends support to a "not guilty" verdict 
because it supports an inference that Angela did not intend to take the dress. Why would 
someone seeking to steal an item stand in the cashier's line with the item in plain view? 
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4) Ms. Waldron observed defendant, dress always in hand, browse the 
clothes racks while periodically looking up at Ms. Waldron and her 
husband. 
This evidence also does not support the jury's verdict. Ms. Waldron testified that 
she observed Angela browse the racks for only "three minutes" before losing eye contact 
with her and at that time she did not see her again before leaving the dressing room. R. 
130: 100. 
5) In the company of a cashier, Ms. Waldron found defendant exiting 
one of the dressing rooms, located by the stores9 exit with an extremely 
full duffel bag in her hand. 
Appellant marshaled this evidence. On page 13 of Appellant's brief, it states: 
"Defendant was seen leaving the dressing room with a duffle bag that appeared to be 
bulging." 
6) Prior to defendant's exit from the dressing rooms, Ms. Waldron had 
not seen anything other than the wedding dress in defendant's possession. 
This does not support the jury's verdict. As mentioned, Ms. Waldron testified that 
she lost eye contact with the appellant and did not see her again before leaving the 
dressing room. The fact that Ms. Waldron did not see Angela carrying anything but the 
wedding dress for three minutes after Angela left the cashier's line does not support a 
guilty verdict. Moreover, this testimony contradicts her testimony at a preliminary 
hearing and thus calls her credibility into question. R. 129:16 
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7) an immediate search of all he [sic] dressing rooms by three employees 
failed to uncover the wedding dress. 
This evidence was not marshaled because it was not competent. Contrary to the 
State's assertion, this evidence was based on hearsay and laying a foundation does not 
remedy a hearsay statement. Even if the Court were to find this evidence competent, it 
does not support the jury's verdict because no testimony was offered that proved Angela 
entered the dressing room with the dress. Rather, the only testimony was that Angela left 
the dressing room with a "bulging" duffle bag, which was marshaled. 
8) both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron saw defendant walk out of the D.I. 
carrying a bulging, small green duffle bag, about afoot-and-halflong. 
This evidence was marshaled on page 13 of Appellant's brief ("Defendant was 
seen leaving the dressing room with a duffle bag that appeared to be bulging"). 
Regarding this evidence, it is important to note that the prosecution's own witnesses have 
changed their testimony throughout the course of this case. For example, Mr. Wilcox told 
police officers at the scene that the duffle bag was blue. See Exhibit 4 of Addendum to 
Appelant's Opening Brief, Police Report, page 2. Then at the preliminary hearing Mr. 
Wilcox testified that the duffle bag was brown. R. 129:24. Finally at the trial, he stated 
that it was green. R. 130:45. Ms. Waldron testified at trial that the duffle bag was blue, 
not brown. R. 130:90. This may not seem like a relevant fact but it strongly supports the 
inference that the witnesses could not remember the characteristics of the bag, let alone 
whether it appeared to be "bulging." These contradictions weaken, not strengthen, the 
prosecution's case. Nevertheless, this evidence was marshaled. 
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9) Mr. Wilcox approached defendant in a calm and friendly manner, 
asking to speak with her. 
This evidence was also marshaled. On page 13 of Appellant's brief, Appellant 
marshals the evidence that defendant fled the scene despite repeated requests to stop. Mr. 
Wilcox's approach was a request to stop. Furthermore this marshaled evidence 
encompasses other evidence that the State alleges Appellant failed to marshal- to wit, 
number 13 (that defendant turned and fled to her car) and number 14 (Mr. Wilcox again 
attempted to address defendant). 
10) in accordance with his usual practice, Mr. Wilcox was wearing a red 
employee vest along with a large identifying name tag. 
This evidence does not support the jury's verdict. No evidence was introduced 
that Ms. Rasmussen noticed Wilcox's clothing. Furthermore, on cross-examination, Mr. 
Wilcox admitted that defense counsel had seen him previously without the vest, despite 
his testimony that he "absolutely" wears the vest at all times. R. 130: 55-56. Thus, this 
evidence calls Mr. Wilcox's credibility into question. Moreover, how what Mr. Wilcox 
was wearing evidences guilt is beyond Appellant. 
11) Mr. Wilcox is disabled, to wit: he has a prosthetic knee, which 
prevents him from running and he has one lung, which necessitates his 
wearing a plainly visible oxygen tank. 
It is hard to understand how this supports a guilty verdict for theft. Mr. Wilcox's 
infirmities are irrelevant as to whether Ms. Rasmussen actually took the wedding dress 
from the store. Also, it is important to note that Mr. Wilcox testified that Angela was 10-
15 feet from the store when she turned and ran to her car. His infirmities make his 
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testimony unbelievable.1 Yet, in spite of his ailments, Mr. Wilcox was able to reach 
Angela's car before she attempted to leave the parking lot and the prosecutor elicited no 
testimony that Angela waited for Mr. Wilcox to make his way to her car. R. 130: 45-46. 
Thus, the testimony of his ailments and his inability to walk calls into question the 
sequence of events and his ability to do what he said. This evidence does not tip the 
scales in favor of guilt but innocence, and trial counsel should have argued as much to the 
jury. This in not evidence that tends to establish guilt and need not have been marshaled. 
12) both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron testified that defendant, from her 
reactions, was aware that Mr. Wilcox had tried to accost her. 
Rather than support the jury's verdict, this evidence supports the evidence given 
by Ms. Rasmussen that she was intimidated by Mr. Wilcox and that she went to her car 
and locked the doors to be safe from the threat. R. 130: 146-47. 
13) in response to Mr. Wilcox's attempts to accost her, defendant turned 
and fled to her car. 
Appellant marshaled this evidence. See number 9 above. 
'Mrs. Waldron approached Mr. Wilcox to tell him about the wedding dress, at first 
he could not make out what she was saying. Once he knew what she was implying, he 
faced the bid area and observed that the dress was gone, he asked Mrs. Waldron if she 
was sure. He then observed Angela leaving the dressing room with a bag. Mr. Wilcox 
then alerted three employees to search all four dressing rooms for the dress, he indicates 
that he waited for this search to be completed before he pursued Angela. He asked Mrs. 
Waldron to accompany him and together they left the store. When they exited, Angela 
was approximately 10-15 feet ahead of them, he asked her to stop, she then ran to her car. 
Wilcox walked down to the end of the lot to where Angela's car was parked, he 
approached her car and Angela jumped in. He knocked on her window, Angela backed 
her car out and Wilcox jumped or fell against the next car. 
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14) Mr. [sic] Waldron confirmed that when Mr. Wilcox reached 
defendant's car, he again attempted to address defendant in a friendly 
manner by tapping on the car window. 
Appellant marshaled this evidence. See number 9 above. 
15) in response, defendant started her car and put it in reverse, causing it 
to go "screaming backwards," knocking Mr. Wilcox toward another car; 
then, with her car pointing directly at Mr. Wilcox, defendant revved her 
engine and drove right at him. 
Along with the next two items of evidence, Appellant marshaled this evidence in 
the statement that "Defendant hit an individual with her car." The "screaming 
backwards" was a point on which there was considerable disagreement amongst 
prosecution witnesses, R. 130: 93, all of which calls the varied accounts into question and 
weakens not strengthens the prosecution case. 
16) defendant hit Mr. Wilcox with her car once and then a second time, 
throwing him onto the hood and then to the pavement car [sic], causing 
him serious bodily [injury] [sic]. 
Appellant marshaled this evidence. See number 15 above. Moreover, this is a 
point of significant contradiction among the prosecution's witnesses, R. 130:49, 74, 77-
78, 94, 97, which again weakens not strengthens the prosecution's case. Appellant did 
not "marshall" or point out these weakening inconsistencies. 
17) Ms. Waldron testified that the defendant had room to avoid hitting 
Mr. Wilcox and considered the incident intentional and not accidental. 
Appellant marshaled this evidence. See number 15 above. Also, with respect to 
whether Ms. Waldron considered the incident intentional and not accidental, this evidence 
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is incompetent in that it is based on speculation. Moreover it contradicts Mr. Wilcox's 
own testimony. R. 130: 74. 
18) five employees, including Mr. Wilcox, again searched the D.I. store 
for the wedding dress on January 15, immediately after the incident and 
repeatedly in days afterward, but failed to find it. 
This evidence does not support the jury's findings. Whether the dress could be 
found is irrelevant because nobody ever saw Angela leave with the dress. In fact this 
evidence supports Appellant's testimony that she set the dress down while browsing the 
store. 
19) the missing dress reappeared in the bid area five days after the 
robbery in a place in which it would have been difficult to see. 
Both the fact that the dress reappeared and in a hard to see place, supports the 
inference that the dress never left the store and thus, that no theft occurred, and not an 
inference of guilt. 
20) defendant seriously undermined her own credibility by giving 
testimony which in light of the testimony of other witnesses and 
circumstances, was highly implausible and, by inference, incriminating. 
Not one case explaining marshaling of the evidence mandates that appellate 
counsel intimate that the defendant lied on the witness stand.2 This is what the State 
expects appellate counsel to do however. Furthermore, whether other witnesses 
Tn fact, for appellate counsel to suggest his client lied would likely violate Rule 
1.3 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers must litigate their client's case 
with diligence and zeal. To suggest that a client is lying violates that mandate. 
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contradicted appellant's trial testimony is not a piece of "evidence" that must be 
marshaled. 
One of the principle reasons litigants are required to marshal the evidence in 
challenging a jury verdict is to aid "the appellate courts in deliberations and in the 
opinion-writing process." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
this case, Appellant has marshaled sufficient evidence to allow this Court to deliberate 
and write its opinion. To suggest that one must repeatedly marshal the same evidence or 
that one must marshal incompetent or unsupportive evidence implies that the Court is 
incapable of writing an intelligent opinion with only the essential evidence in front of it. 
Since that is not the case, this Court should rule that the appellant has sufficiently 
marshaled the evidence in order to challenge the jury's verdict. 
B. The Marshaled Evidence is Insufficient to Support the Jury's Guilty 
Verdict. 
As discussed fully in the Appellant's opening brief, the marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. It is true that to succeed in challenging the 
jury's verdict the evidence and inferences based on that evidence must be "inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was committed." State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). The Petree court went on to explain however that the 
reviewing court must analyze the evidence closely to assure that it rebutts the 
presumption of innocence. The court stated: 
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[T]his court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its 
duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary 
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a 
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The 
evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 444-45 (emphasis added). The case at hand is precisely the type of case the Petree 
court warned of; one where the Court would be required - even after stretching the fabric 
of the State's evidence to its limits - to make the speculative leap described to affinn the 
jury's verdict. 
The State's evidence of theft in this case was entirely circumstantial. Although it 
is true that a conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence, "'[a] guilty verdict is 
not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or 
speculative possibilities of guilt.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). In this case the inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence surrounding 
theft are so remote and speculative that the jury's verdict cannot stand. 
The State makes much of the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with 
the wedding dress before it allegedly disappeared and that she left the store immediately 
after the disappearance. In this regard, this case is similar to Petree. In that case, Petree 
was convicted of murder because he was the last person seen with the victim before she 
disappeared, and he left town shortly after the disappearance. See Petree, 659 P.2d at 
445. The court however reversed the jury's verdict and discharged Petree from custody. 
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See id. at 447. This case is similar because the only evidence that the wedding dress was 
stolen was that Angela was the last person seen with it and she left with the duffle bag 
shortly after the dress' "disappearance." Particularly damning to the State's case is the 
fact that the dress was found in the D.I. store less than five days later, with no explanation 
as to how it "reappeared."3 Indeed, the admitted lack of evidence as to how it reappears 
compels a jury to speculate as to how it got back. With the dress back in the store and no 
direct evidence that it ever left- the jury's conclusion is clearly based on a remote and 
speculative possibility of guilt. 
Because of this snag, the State in its appellate brief tries to employ the same tactic 
that the prosecution at trial used-it draws attention away from the problems of proof on 
the theft portion and focuses on the actions that occurred in the D.I. parking lot. At trial, 
the tactic succeeded in confusing and thus persuading the jury. As evidenced by the 
jury's question seeking to separate the actions that occurred inside the D.I. from the 
actions that occurred outside, it is clear that the jury convicted Angela based on the 
parking lot events. But ua defendant's flight from a crime scene, standing alone, 'does 
not support an inference of intentional conduct.'" State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74, ^ J 23, 10 
P.3d 346 (Utah 2000) (citations omitted) (stating also that "[f]light by itself is not 
3Despite the State's assertion that the inference is that the dress was "secreted back 
into the D.I.," see State's brief at 19, the prosecutor at trial specifically stated: "We 
haven't said she brought it back. I don't know if she brought it back. Nobody testified to 
that. We don't know how it got back, but its back in the store." R. 131:206, (emphasis 
added). Thus the prosecutor invites the jury to speculate, at a minimum as to how it got 
back in the store. 
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sufficient to establish guilt of the defendant"). Thus, the jury mistakenly convicted 
Angela of this crime. This Court now has the opportunity to remedy the jury's mistake 
by reversing the verdict. 
It is clear that in convicting Angela the jury made several "speculative leaps." 
Reasonable minds surely entertained a reasonable doubt as to Angela's guilt in this case. 
To affirm the jury's verdict would require the Court to make similar "speculative leaps." 
Petree warned against such action and therefore the Court should reverse the jury verdict, 
holding that the State's evidence-stretched to its limits-was insufficient in proving 
Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III. THE STATE'S ASSERTION THAT THE COURT SHOULD NOT 
CONSIDER THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE ISSUE EMPHASIZES 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS IN FAILING TO PROFFER 
THE EXCLUDED EVIDENCE. 
It is true that trial counsel failed to proffer the testimony that was excluded at trial. 
This simply adds to the laundry list of examples of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. 
Appellant agrees that trial counsel erred in failing to proffer the evidence. Appellant 
asserts however that this evidence was indeed important and would have affected the 
outcome of the case. 
First it is important to note that appellate counsel, and Appellant herself for the 
most part had no control over trial counsel. Trial counsel wholly failed to proffer the 
evidence that the trial court excluded, evidence that would have explained Angela's 
actions in the parking lot. Consequently the presentence report-which gives details of a 
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previous assault that caused Angela to be apprehensive when approached by a strange 
man-contains the only proof of what the testimony would have been. (Presentence 
Report, R. 128 at p. 3). This evidence was extremely important to negate the intent 
element of the robbeiy crime and failing to proffer it after exclusion-along with the 
various other deficiencies described in Appellant's opening brief-emphasizes trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness. 
The evidence, if accepted, would have changed the outcome of the case. As 
mentioned, the jury mistakenly convicted Appellant based on the events that occurred in 
the D.I. parking lot. If trial counsel would have introduced evidence explaining her 
actions, the jury would likely have reached a different result. Furthermore, as explained 
in Appellant's opening brief, the evidence was directly relevant to disprove criminal 
intent. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 17 (citing State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991)). 
Tellingly, the State fails even to address the contention that the exclusion of the 
evidence was harmless. While the State's failure was perhaps an oversight, it also lends 
credence to Appellant's contention that the evidence was anything but harmless. The 
judge abused his discretion, and the court should reverse the verdict. 
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IV. AN ADEQUATE RECORD OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S DEFICIENCIES 
EXISTS TO SUPPORT A DETERMINATION THAT TRIAL COUNSEL 
WAS INEFFECTIVE AND IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT AN 
ADEQUATE RECORD IS LACKING, IT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE 
FOR THE ENTRY OF FINDINGS SUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE THE 
RECORD. 
With regard to the adequacy of the record demonstrating trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness, the State returns to the worn refrain that counsel's (this time appellate) 
sins should be visited on Appellant's head. Seemingly, the State seeks to avoid at all 
costs dealing with the merits of the ineffectiveness claim. It is not demanding, however, 
to examine the record and find numerous examples of ineffectiveness. But, if the Court 
finds that the record does not support the ineffectiveness claim, it should remand the case 
for a Rule 23B hearing in order to complete the record and do justice to the appellant. 
The court clearly has the power. Rule 23B(c) Utah R. App. P. 
The State again lists several items that it alleges are unsupported by the record. 
However, the absence of some of these items constitutes record support of 
ineffectiveness. For example, the record does not indicate that counsel introduced the 
duffle bag into evidence. However, failure to introduce the duffle bag is precisely one of 
the many reasons why counsel was ineffective. Absence in the record of actions that 
counsel should have taken supports ineffectiveness. This same analysis can be done with 
failure to call the psychiatrist, failure to put on evidence that items in the D.I. are 
frequently misplaced, and failure to point out discrepancies in witness testimony. 
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If the Court finds that the ineffectiveness claim is not properly supported in the 
record, the proper action is not to punish the Appellant for it, but rather to remand the 
case for findings necessary to support the claim pursuant to Rule 23B Utah R. App. P. 
Rule 23B allows a motion for remand for "entry of findings of fact, necessary for the 
appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." The rule 
makes clear that the court retains the power to remand on its own motion: "Nothing in 
this rule shall prohibit the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own 
motion at any time if the claim has been raised and the motion would have been available 
to a party." In State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, Tfl7n. 7, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000), the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed this portion of the rule. After explaining that an inadequate 
record will result in construction of deficiencies in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively, the court stated: "This standard does not preclude an appellate 
court from remanding on its own motion. The rule expressly provides that the appellate 
court may remand according to its discretion." 
The fact that a portion of the ineffectiveness evidence is arguably not contained in 
the record does not lead to the conclusion that the evidence does not exist. Much of the 
evidence is contained in the report generated by the police officers who investigated the 
scene and other documents. To avoid the form over substance approach the State 
17 
advocates, the Court should remand this case for the necessary findings in the event that it 
determines the ineffective assistance claim is not properly supported by the record.4 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold that the Appellant sufficiently 
marshaled the evidence and that the marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the 
jury's finding. In that event, the Court should reverse the jury's verdict and discharge the 
appellant. Alternatively, the Court should rule that trial counsel for the appellant was 
ineffective and that the ineffectiveness is supported by the record. If the Court 
determines that the ineffectiveness is not supported by the record, it should remand the 
case to the trial court for a Rule 23B hearing. If the Court rules that counsel was 
ineffective or that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence, the case 
should be remanded for a new trial consistent with the Court's decision. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Appellant has filed a Motion for Expedited Decision Without Written Opinion 
contemporaneously with the Response Brief. Appellant respectfully requests oral 
argument however on this appeal. 
4Such a hearing seems wholly unnecessary inasmuch as the thrust of the 
Appellant's position is that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. If the 
Court accepts this argument, no 23B hearing would be warranted and in fact would waste 
judicial resources. If the Court rules that the evidence is sufficient however, it should 
remand the case for a Rule 23B hearing, particularly where as here the evidence clearly 
exists it simply has not been made a part of the official record on appeal. 
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Dated this gh 'day of April, 2001. 
2 
Randy T. Austin 
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